THE GAMES THE MARINE CORPS PLAYS:

The games were invaluable, but they were not crystal balls.

I teach a graduate class in red teaming and war-gaming at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. I stress several things to my students. First, war games do not validate anything. When done well, they can identify issues in a plan or concept that can help improve it. Sometimes, they kill a badly conceived concept in the cradle. Second, it is very rare for a war game or even a series of games to predict anything; they merely lessen the chance of total surprise.

Thus, I was surprised to learn that the Marine Corps claimed to have validated its Force Design (FD) 2030 concept based on a few war games and became alarmed about the fact that the current commandant of the Marine Corps has undertaken a radical restructuring of the service having used the games to justify his actions.

Essentially, the Corps had walked away from its traditional role as the nation’s worldwide “911” force to concentrate on an anti-ship role in the South China Sea. In doing so, it got rid of all its tanks, its heavy engineering assets, much of its conventional artillery, and about one-third of its aviation capabilities. All this was done to buy anti-ship missiles designed to deny the Chinese naval dominance of the South China Sea by occupying small islets in the area with small units firing those missiles at Chinese ships.

I am not inspired to confidence.