The 9/11 Commission relied on information derived from two captured al Qaeda perpetrators for much of its picture of the conspiracy leading up to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The interrogations of these men–Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or “KSM,” who masterminded the plot and got Osama bin Laden to finance it, and Ramzi Binalshibh, who acted as KSM’s liaison with lead suicide terrorist Mohamed Atta–were performed by the CIA at secret locations.
KSM claimed that he left almost all the tactical details to Atta, and therefore could not say where Atta went, or whom he visited, in the final months of the plot. Binalshibh claimed he was Atta’s only contact with al Qaeda during this period and that, other than himself, Atta never met with anyone on his trips abroad in 2001.
If these accounts are true, it follows that the conspiracy was a contained one, and the 9/11 Commission could preclude outside collaborators, including the participation of foreign countries. Thus, although the CIA was unable to trace the origin of the money supplied to Atta, the commission deemed this gap “of little practical significance” since the CIA’s prisoners established that no one else was involved in the plot. Thus, too, when the CIA found that Iran had “apparently facilitated” the travel of eight of the 9/11 muscle hijackers in flights to and from Afghanistan (by not putting the required stamps on their passports, and by having a top Hezbollah official accompany their flights in and out of Iran), the commission could nevertheless rule out the possibility Iran or Hezbollah were “aware of the planning.” The basis for this conclusion was the information provided by KSM and Binalshibh.
But what if these CIA prisoners–who after all are diehard jihadists–were lying? . . .
Yet if Mr. Garzon is correct about the Spanish connection to 9/11, it is not only the effectiveness of the CIA’s interrogation of its al Qaeda prisoners that is called into question. The information from Binalshibh, KSM and other detainees was used to fill in the missing pieces of the jigsaw, and those gaps concerned the contacts the 9/11 conspirators might have had with others wishing to harm America. By saying that no one else was involved–not in Spain, Iran, Hezbollah, Malaysia, Iraq, the Czech Republic or Pakistan–these detainees allowed the 9/11 Commission to complete its picture of al Qaeda as a solitary entity.
Yet to come to its conclusion on this most fundamental issue, the commission was prohibited from seeing any of the detainees whose accounts it relied on. Nor was it allowed even to question the CIA interrogators to determine the way that information was obtained. The commission’s joint chairmen themselves later acknowledged that they “had no way of evaluating the credibility of detainee information.” So when Judge Garzon comes up with evidence that runs counter to detainees’ claims, cracks begin to emerge in the entire picture.
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