YES: NATO’s Hypersonic Defense Problem Is Industrial, Not Technological.

The Alliance is not defenseless. Ukrainian Patriot batteries have already intercepted Kinzhal, missiles once marketed by Russia as “unstoppable.” But the Oreshnik strike underscored a more immediate danger. NATO’s defenses are not keeping pace with the threat environment because our industrial and procurement timelines are too slow. This is not primarily a question of physics. It is a question of production, stockpiles, and speed.

Russia and China are both pressing their advantages. Russia fields a mix of fast and maneuverable systems—Kinzhals, Zircons, and Iskanders—that stress Ukrainian and NATO defenses daily. China’s missile arsenal is larger and more systematic. Its DF-17 glide vehicle and anti-ship ballistic missiles (DF-21D and DF-26) are designed to hold U.S. and allied forces at risk. None of these weapons are magical, but they are being produced and deployed at scale.

The Alliance’s challenge is less about invention than about execution.

NATO has the building blocks in place. The United States already operates space-based infrared satellites that can detect launches globally, and new layers like the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and the Space Development Agency’s Tracking Layer are beginning to provide continuous tracking of maneuvering threats. Interceptors like Patriot have already destroyed Kinzhals in combat. Glide-phase interceptors are in development through the U.S.–Japan program, and Europe has its own concept study in HYDIS².

The problem is timelines.

And don’t even get me started on drones, where gold-plated bureaucratic inertia will likely cost us bigly someday.