HMM: Inducing a Sino-Russian Split Through Ukraine.

How, then, can Washington engineer a Sino-Russian split? The answer lies in creating a proper incentive structure. To paraphrase Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis, to expect concessions to Moscow on Ukraine today to be reciprocated with Russian concessions on China is naive: Putin’s strategy will not change until the Kremlin has encountered a sufficiently long string of failures to convince his successors that Russia’s current alignment with Beijing will fail to advance its interests. Or, to borrow from Kennan, Washington must embrace “a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” to punish Russian alignment with China.

The aim, therefore, ought to be a demonstration to both Russia and China that their partnership will bring more costs than benefits. An extended period of confrontation whereby U.S. actions make it impossible for Russia to further its interests, and where Chinese alignment with Russia harms its wider economic and political interests, will then enable the aforementioned tensions in the partnership to fester. Then and only then will their contradictions be ripe for exploitation.

It is worth noting that there exists a historical precedent for such a strategy. During the Cold War, to break the Sino-Soviet partnership crafted by Mao’s “tilt” to the Soviets, Eisenhower pursued a policy aimed at generating tensions between Moscow and Beijing by making China more dependent on the Soviet Union through dogged political and economic confrontation.

This policy helped create the conditions for Nixon’s opening.

An interesting read and probably worth your time.