ERIC BERGER: I trust NASA’s safety culture this time around, and so should you.

If it does not precisely repeat itself, history certainly echoes. Two decades after Columbia, Starliner is presently docked to the International Space Station. As with foam strikes, issues with reaction-control system thrusters are not unique to this flight; they were also observed during the previous test flight in 2022. So once again, engineers at NASA are attempting to decide whether they can be comfortable with a “known” issue and all of its implications for a safe return to Earth.

NASA is the customer for this mission rather than the operator—the space agency is buying transportation services to the International Space Station for its astronauts from Boeing. However, as the customer, NASA still has the final say. Boeing engineers will have input, but the final decisions will be made by NASA engineers such as Steve Stich, Ken Bowersox, and Jim Free. Ultimately, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson could have the final say.

Decision-makers today have some decided advantages over their predecessors for Columbia. Whereas the shuttle had made dozens of successful flights by 2003, Starliner remains very much in its test and development phase. Therefore, it’s difficult to fall into the “we’ve seen this before” trap. Additionally, whereas the shuttle had a limited lifetime in orbit due to fuel cells and other consumables, mission managers have the luxury of studying Starliner’s issues not over a matter of days but over weeks and even months.

Finally, in a massive change from 2003, NASA managers have a readily available back-up option to get the crew home: the reliable Crew Dragon spacecraft.

I wonder if the existence of Crew Dragon influenced NASA’s decision to go ahead with Starliner’s extended-stay crew flight test, despite one failed unmanned test and a second flight test that, while successful, had issues with the maneuvering thrusters.