THE UKRAINE SUPPLY LINE WAR: Logistics Rules the Battlefield

The four-month-old Ukrainian offensive in southern Ukraine recently achieved a major objective. Ukrainian forces advanced to within GMLRS missile range of the only Russian rail line that carried supplies to occupied Crimea. Ukraine had already disabled the other rail supply route to Crimea, which used the Kerch Strait bridge.

The significance:

Russia’s loss of its last rail supply line to the Crimea (which also means rail supply is cut off to much of Russian-occupied Ukraine east of the Crimea) is particularly critical concerning diesel and other liquid fuels because those are necessary for Russian tactical communications, which are largely based on vehicles because Russian man-portable field radios are scarce and insecure due to lack of effective encryption. Russian vehicle-mounted radios and associated electronics, such as computerized sights for tanks, must be charged by the vehicles’ own batteries as Russian military vehicles lack the auxiliary power units (APUs) that Western military vehicles use. So Russian vehicles must run their motors for about an hour a day to charge their batteries even when they are not in action. That burns up a lot of fuel, so the Russian forces in Crimea and just to the east of it will have their combat power reduced by 50-80% in ten or so days. In addition to being out of ammunition.

It’s the latest StrategyPage Logistics Update (Jim Dunnigan’s online How To Make War).

GMLRS = Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System. Here’s a photo of a USMC wheeled M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) participating in a live fire exercise. Ukraine fields the HIMARS. This Air Weapons update from 2018 discusses US Army and US Marine Corps use of the HIMARS. GMLRS rocket range varies — newer versions can hit targets 70-90 kilometers away. Longer range variants are in the works.