The Promise and Pitfalls of an “Israel Model” for Ukraine.

Arming a state rather than allying with it formally can be an effective way to promote defense and deterrence without running the risks of binding treaty commitments. But a deeper understanding of the transformation of the US-Israel relationship over the last half-century suggests that there are likely to be both pros and cons to applying the Israel model in Ukraine. If policymakers do pursue this path, history suggests pitfalls of which they should be aware.

The most obvious benefit of building an Israel-style relationship with Ukraine is that it is one of the most efficient ways to strengthen Ukrainian deterrence and enable that country to defend itself. Indeed, in some ways, the United States has already spent the last 18 months building such a relationship with Ukraine. In the case of Israel, the United States has committed to maintain the country’s “qualitative military edge” to compensate for a quantitative disadvantage. To offset this numerical superiority, Israel relies on advanced technologies, much of which it acquires through foreign military sales and aid from the United States. The ways in which the United States is currently supporting Ukraine — including providing top-of-the-line weapons — are remarkably similar. Though they will not single-handedly enable Ukraine to win a war, Western systems such as Stinger missiles or Leopard tanks have been essential in helping Ukraine to damage and repel larger and better-equipped Russian forces. Committing to maintain Ukraine’s qualitative edge over the longer-term would largely be a recognition and formalization of existing practice.

NATO doesn’t import wars or even border disputes, which is why countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have had their participation limited to the Partnership for Peace program. Assuming Ukraine still exists after this current war, something like the “Israel model” makes sense.