GOOD QUESTION: What Comes After INF?

Should the United States withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty? Colin Gray and Matthew Costlow argue that the time has come for Washington to walk away from the Treaty because it no longer serves to promote American national security.[1] Their arguments about the growing weakness of the current INF regime are sound and command respect.

In their analysis, however, they give insufficient attention to the tangible security benefits that the current INF regime confers on the United States, including its stabilizing effect on U.S.-Russian relations, as well as its important role in promoting enduring American advantages in naval and aerial strike capabilities against the missile challenges of Eurasian land powers like Russia. In minimizing the role that the INF Treaty plays in promoting American military advantages, they fail to provide a roadmap for what the United States ought to do after withdrawing from the Treaty. The logic behind the INF Treaty is sound, even if the current Treaty needs revision. To paraphrase Voltaire, if an INF Treaty didn’t exist, the United States would have to invent one. The time may be approaching to abandon the existing INF framework, but American leaders would do well to recognize both the strengths and weaknesses of that framework and plan their departure to maximize the chances of returning to a more secure, robust INF Treaty in the near future.

The problem isn’t that the INF is a bad deal. The problem is that Moscow has spent years violating it flagrantly and with impunity.