April 02, 2008

AUSTIN BAY: Whittling Away At Sadr.

UPDATE: A lengthy email from a Colonel in Baghdad provides some more background. Click "read more" to read it.

Email follows:

This past week has been quite a challenge with the highest level of insurgent attacks in Baghdad, ever. Not just "since I've been here" ever, but "since the war began" ever. Obviously, with GEN Petraeus' testimony coming up soon, I would really hate it if people used the insurgent attacks to undermine the incredible value added by the surge, or the vital importance of remaining here until the Government of Iraq is viable.

The unclassified, open-source, bottom line is this: The insurgent attacks did not happen "in spite of" the surge. Insurgents attacked in Basrah where foreign military influence is fanning the flames of discontent over the lack of essential services. People in Basrah are upset because they don't have access to clean water, sewage, trash removal, or fuel for cooking and transportation. They know who to blame, but they don't know who to turn to to fix the problems. They lashed out, Maliki's government moved to squelch it, and the Coalition stayed largely on the sidelines. OK, we provided targets. And maybe we helped a little, if you count helicopter gunships and Predator UAVs. But essentially, this was an internal Iraqi affair.

I wish you could have heard General Petraeus' steady response as the situation unfolded: very deliberate, yet calming. It was quite dramatic here, and a lesser leader might have over-reacted. I anticipate that some members of our own society will use this spate of violence to claim the surge failed and call for our immediate withdrawal. That would be a terrible decision based on a tragic misreading of what just happened.

The General can expect to be grilled by Congress and the press over this, but the violence reflects on Iraqi politics and ineffective provincial government, not on the surge or the value of our continued presence here.

From watching the news, you know Maliki moved to Basrah in a show of force. He made lots of blustery statements about what he was going to do to the Jayesh al Mahdi (JAM). The Baghdad arm of JAM, headquartered in Sadr City, responded with a little fireworks of their own in Maliki's absence. In hindsight, Mr Maliki may have overplayed a bit, and some feel he lost credibility in the process.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, General Petraeus quietly and deftly encouraged the central government of Iraq to:

(a) concentrate not on JAM, but on the criminal element within JAM. "Anyone on the street with a weapon is a criminal." This effectively divided the JAM members. Next,

(b) focus on the humanitarian element of the operation. Pushing much-needed food and water to trapped inhabitants encouraged even more JAM members to stay home and take care of family members. Finally,

(c) show that fighting is not going to solve the needs of Iraq.

By addressing the essential services issues and bringing central government people to the provincial sessions to address concerns, people see their government taking an active role in solving the problem.

The effect was that Moqtada al Sadr got to make a point, Maliki demonstrated his resolve, the Iraqi Army and Police showed themselves to be capable and professional, and there's a sense of a better day coming in Basrah. Without the strong response of the central Government, the militia-led uprising could have very easily led to further lawlessness, mayhem, and devastation. The Coalition trained and helped equip and arm the Iraqi Army. The surge allowed us to clear and hold areas long enough to bring violence levels down, so the government could start focusing on essential services. If anything, the surge came too late because people have been without services for far too long.

There is a huge problem with transparency in the Government of Iraq (GoI). Money is coming in from the sale of oil, and budgets are being drafted to pay bills and provide services. But the ministries are doing a poor job of spending their allocated money on priorities. They are doing an even worse job accounting for the money. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are putting as much pressure as humanly possible on the GoI to perform, but there is much corruption and little accountability.

I don't know how long before the GoI will transform into a model government able to care for its citizenry. However, if the Coalition left suddenly at this point in time, the many tribal and sectarian militias, like JAM, would seize control from the GoI. Soldiers would return home to fight for their homes and families. The country would slip into civil war along sectarian lines over distribution of oil revenues. The Sunnis would seek partnerships with Saudi Arabia and the Shia with Iran, and you can see where that would be heading. These recent insurgent attacks cannot be allowed to undermine the incredible value added by the surge. Likewise, the vital importance of remaining here until the Government of Iraq is viable cannot be overstated.

Stay tuned.